CB Arbitrage Desk Refinitiv · LSEG Eikon updated 2026-05-17 08:07
DEMO MODE · Static snapshot. The live version (running locally) pulls fresh Refinitiv data every weekday at 08:04. View code on GitHub.

Risk management framework

The signal is one layer; the risk-control layer is what turns it into a tradeable book. Below are the hard limits a real desk would impose, and a backtest review showing how the existing trade history would have respected (or breached) them.

Defined limits

Per-issuer notional cap

¥200,000,000 hard ceiling per issuer regardless of how cheap. Stops the strategy from over-concentrating in a single name even if the signal stays strong.

Per-issuer concentration

No single issuer can exceed 25.0% of equity at any time. The backtest concentration analysis showed our top 5 issuers were 113% of P&L — this limit forces broader diversification.

Per-trade size cap

Maximum 20.0% of equity in any single trade. Matches the 5-slot sizing scheme.

VaR limits

1-day 95% historical VaR: warn at 2.0% of NAV (soft), block new entries at 4.0% (hard). Standard hedge-fund discipline.

Drawdown circuit breakers

At -5.0% rolling drawdown: halve all new position sizes. At -10.0%: halt new entries entirely.

Total deployment

Max 100.0% of equity deployed simultaneously. No leverage on top of cash; cash earns the JPY money-market rate.

Backtest review · how the limits would have behaved

Trades reviewed77
Accepted as-is68
Resized down9
Rejected0
Avg 1d 95% VaR0.74%
Peak 1d 95% VaR0.98%
What this means Out of 77 historical trades, the risk framework would have accepted 68 as-is, resized 9 (all from concentration breaches in our biggest winners), and rejected 0. The 1-day 95% VaR averaged 0.74% of NAV — well inside the 2% soft limit — meaning the strategy was never close to breaching risk budgets. Interpretation: the strategy is small-vol enough at 5-slot sizing that risk limits rarely bite. Tighter limits would only matter at higher concentration.

Trades that hit a limit

Entry date Issuer Entry cheap% Proposed ¥ Accepted ¥ % equity Decision Why
2023-06-16 Mercari +19.3 150,000,000 37,500,000 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=150M + 150M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.7% > 25.0%)
2024-08-02 Daifuku +6.5 148,812,994 37,203,248 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=149M + 149M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.9% > 25.0%)
2024-08-05 Nagoya Railroad +5.2 148,812,994 37,264,406 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=149M + 149M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.9% > 25.0%)
2024-08-05 Kobe Steel +8.4 148,812,994 37,203,248 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=149M + 149M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.9% > 25.0%)
2024-11-01 Daifuku +7.1 149,627,509 37,406,877 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=150M + 150M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.7% > 25.0%)
2024-11-04 Kobe Steel +5.2 149,627,509 37,406,877 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=150M + 150M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (26.7% > 25.0%)
2025-04-07 Daifuku +6.3 145,966,746 36,491,686 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=146M + 146M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (27.4% > 25.0%)
2026-03-06 Rohm +5.3 144,964,969 36,241,242 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=145M + 145M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (27.6% > 25.0%)
2026-04-22 Daifuku +5.0 144,964,969 36,241,242 5.0% RESIZED issuer_notional_cap (cur=145M + 145M > 200M); issuer_pct_cap (27.6% > 25.0%)

What's not modelled (be honest in interviews)